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Abstract The paper concerns the expression of non-strict comparison, focusing in
particular on constructions of the form [no(t) . . .-er than] in modified numerals.
The main empirical finding is the observation that negated comparatives contrast
with regular comparatives in that the former but not the latter can give rise to
(scalar) implicatures. It is shown that such a contrast falls out of theories of
exhaustive interpretation that claim alternatives to form dense scales. An important
result is that the paper sharpens the desiderata for theories of exhaustification.
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1 Introduction
The comparative morpheme, -er in English, expresses what I call strict comparison.
That is, it corresponds to the >- or <-relation rather than to the - or -relation. In
logic, the latter kind of comparison is related to the former kind by negation. That is, the
-relation is the complement of the<-relation and the-relation is the complement of
the >-relation. This paper considers to what extent these correspondences are fleshed
out in natural language. My main focus is on a rather specific kind of comparative
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construction, namely the kind that fits the scheme [no(t) . . .-er]. In particular, I will be
looking at the use of such constructions in modified numerals, as in (1).
(1) Cody found no more than sixteen marbles.
The main reason for looking into the domain of modified numerals is because there
we can compare the no more construction to other expressions that seem to involve
non-strict comparison. Furthermore, as I will show, the present study sheds light on
an important topic in the semantics of modified numerals, namely the issue of why
they (generally) fail to give rise to implicatures. What I intend to show is that the
mechanisms of exhaustive interpretation are sensitive to the distinction between
strict and non-strict comparison.
A large part of the paper is devoted to establishing how exactly the data with
respect to the interpretation of no(t) -er corresponds to basic assumptions regarding
the semantics of comparison. Thus, Sect. 3 presents the observation that no more
does not generally express non-strict comparison, but gives rise to stronger, double-
bounded interpretations. I propose that these interpretations are due to (scalar)
implicatures. In a nutshell, the observation is that an example like (1) is often
interpreted not as expressing the complement of Cody finding more than 16 mar-
bles, but rather as expressing that Cody found exactly 16 marbles, with an additional
evaluative meaning according to which 16 is thought to be few. Such an interpre-
tation, I will argue, can be accounted for if we assume that no more gets its
expected logical interpretation, but that (under normal circumstances) this inter-
pretation is subject to exhaustification, yielding a stronger interpretation, which is
not only upper- but moreover lower-bounded. Section 4 discusses a theory of
exhaustification from which these observations fall out straightforwardly, namely
Fox and Hackl (2006). Section 5 discusses how the no more construction relates to
other modifiers of numerals that have been thought to express non-strict compari-
son. I sum up the paper’s main observations and the proposed account in Sect. 6 and
give some suggestions for how to account for some additional aspects of the
meaning of no(t) -er. Finally, in Sect. 7, I explore and compare alternative
explanations for the observed patterns.
First, in Sect. 2, I provide some necessary background on the relation between
modified numerals, comparison, and implicatures.
2 Background: modified numerals
One of the most striking features of modified numerals is that they come in a large
variety of forms, but (at least on first sight) carry only a limited range of meanings.
If one assumes that the combination of a modifier and a numeral is a complex
determiner (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan and Stavi 1986), then it is tempting
to think that the determiner denotation in (2a) is expressed by all the modified
numerals in (2b). The same would hold for (3).
272 R. Nouwen
123
(2) a. kA:kB:jA \ Bj > 10
b. more than ten
at least eleven
eleven or more
no fewer than eleven
(3) a. kA:kB:jA \ Bj < 10
b. less than ten
at most nine
nine or fewer
no more than nine
up to nine
It is becoming increasingly clear that such a view of the semantics of modified numerals
is far too simplistic. In particular, there are three ways in which the picture sketched in
(2) and (3) is wrong: (i) it is a mistake to believe that the expressions in (2b)/(3b) are
semantically equivalent; (ii) it is a mistake to believe that the nature of the modifier
(comparative, superlative, disjunction, negation, etc.) is immaterial to what the mod-
ifier expresses; and (iii) it is a mistake to believe that the semantics of any modified
numeral is the relation in (2a) or (3a). I now roughly sketch how such conclusions
follow from three important issues one finds in the recent literature on modified
numerals. These issues will prove important for the discussion of no(t) -er below.
2.1 Issue 1: No implicatures
It has been observed on several occasions, but most explicitly in Krifka (1999), that
contrary to what a naive semantics such as the one in (2)/(3) predicts, modified
numerals do not give rise to implicatures.
On the naive account, (4a) expresses (4b).
(4) a. Cody found more than ten marbles.
b. the number of marbles found by Cody > 10
There are stronger alternatives to (4b) that line up on an entailment scale. That is,
(4b) is asymmetrically entailed by the following:
(5) the number of marbles found by Cody > 11
( the number of marbles found by Cody > 12
( the number of marbles found by Cody > 13
( etc.
Through standard Gricean reasoning, one would expect an implicature to arise
which denies these stronger alternatives. So (4a) should implicate that the number of
marbles found by Cody does not exceed 11 and therefore communicate that the
number of marbles found by Cody is exactly 11. Obviously, this is a wrong
prediction. There have been several proposals to deal with this problem (Krifka
1999; van Rooij and Schulz 2006; Fox and Hackl 2006), but for now it suffices to
simply note its existence. We will return to it below.
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2.2 Issue 2: More than three as a comparative
The naive approach to modified numerals sketched above assumes that there is no
formal link between a modifier like more than and the use of the same and similar
expressions in comparative constructions. It turns out, however, that it makes a lot of
sense to treat more than three as a regular comparative, rather than as a complex
determiner. This has especially been argued by Hackl (2000). One argument he uses
will be particularly insightful for what is to follow. The modified numeral fewer than
n gives rise to an ambiguity that is also found with regular comparatives.1 Consider
(6), which is ambiguous between the weak reading in (6a) and a stronger one in (6b).
(6) You are allowed to pick fewer than ten cards.
a. picking 0–9 cards is allowed (compatible with having permission to pick
more as well)
b. nine is the highest number of cards you may pick
According to the weak reading, (6) says that a situation where someone picks fewer
than 10 cards falls within what is permitted. On this reading, nothing is said about
whether one may or may not pick more cards as well. The preferred reading, however,
is (6b), which gives an upper bound of nine on how many cards may be picked. Exactly
the same ambiguity is discussed by Heim (2000) with respect to normal comparatives.
(7) (This paper has 20 pages.) Your paper is allowed to be less long than that.
a. papers of 1–19 pages are allowed (compatible with having permission
to write more as well)
b. the longest your paper is allowed to be is 19 pages
Heim accounts for this ambiguity structurally, by proposing that the comparative
and the modal can alternate scope. The idea is that the comparative operator plus the
than-clause denotes a quantifier over degrees. This quantifier constitutes the degree
argument of the adjective and has to quantifier-raise to avoid a type clash. Assuming
that comparison involves a maximality operator over degrees, as in (9), the weak
and the strong reading fall out automatically. So, (10a) corresponds to the scope
ordering in (8a) and (10b) to that in (8b).
(8) a. [ allowed [ [less than that]1 your paper is t1 long ] ]
b. [ [less than that]1 [ allowed [ your paper is t1 long ] ] ]
(9) sless than at = kPhd;ti:maxdðPðdÞÞ < a
(10) a. e½ maxdðlongðp; dÞÞ < 20 
b. maxdðelongðp; dÞÞ < 20
Hackl’s observation is now that exactly the same structural ambiguity can be argued
to take place with comparative modified numerals, on the assumption that numerals
1 Actually, one can only show that this ambiguity exists for fewer/less than. For reasons explained in
Heim (2000), the relevant ambiguities are only visible with non-increasing operators.
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involve a covert cardinality operator many. This many can either be interpreted as
an adjective (a predicate of cardinalities) or as a cardinality quantifier as illustrated
in (12) (see Hackl 2000, Chap. 2, for details).
(11) a. [ allowed [ [fewer than ten]1 you pick t1 many cards ] ]
b. [ [fewer than ten]1 [ allowed [ you pick t1 many cards ] ] ]
(12) smanyt ¼ kd:kPhe;ti:kP0he;ti:9x½jxj ¼ d & PðxÞ & P0ðxÞ
(13) sfewer than tent ¼ kPhd;ti:maxdðPðdÞÞ < 10
In parallel to (10), (11a) and (11b) yield the expected readings in (14a) and (14b),
respectively.
(14) a. e½ maxdð9x½jxj ¼ d & cardðxÞ & pickðy; xÞÞ < 10 
b. maxdðe9x½jxj ¼ d & cardðxÞ & pickðy; xÞÞ < 10
What this shows is that the comparative form of certain modified numerals is to be
taken seriously. By just assuming a determiner denotation that relates two cardi-
nalities by > or <, one ignores the fact that such modifiers are real derivatives of
comparative constructions. One might wonder what this means then for other, non-
comparative modifiers of numerals. This is what I turn to next.
2.3 Issue 3: Distinguishing different modifiers
According to the naive approach I have sketched, several modified numerals end up
expressing the same determiner denotation. For instance, ½½at least eleven is
equivalent to ½½more than ten. Geurts and Nouwen (2007) argue extensively that
there is no such equivalence. In Sect. 5 I will repeat some of these arguments, but I
want to point out here already that superlative modifiers like at most and at least
differ from their comparative counterpart with respect to the structural ambiguities
discussed in the previous subsection. According to the naive approach, (15) should
be equivalent to (6).
(15) You are allowed to pick at most nine cards.
a. #picking 0–9 cards is allowed
b. ten is the highest number of cards you may pick
Example (15) lacks the weak reading. That is, it is incompatible with a scenario
where, say, picking 12 cards is (also) permitted. I will return to this example below.
For now it suffices to just keep in mind that formal differences between numeral
modifiers are to be taken seriously.2 This will become increasingly clear in the next
section, where I turn to the semantics of no more than.
2 See Nouwen (2008b), as well as Nouwen (2008a), for more arguments for such a strategy when
studying quantifiers.
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3 The semantics of noðtÞ -er
In the introduction, I remarked that if -er is an expression of strict comparison, then
its negation will have to be an expression of non-strict comparison. This section
tests the linguistic reality of that correspondence.
3.1 Interpreting no more
One way to think of no more is to analyse it as being a differential, in parallel to
twelve more than or a lot more than. On such a view, we would expect a semantics
as in (16) (where P is a property of degrees/cardinalities).
(16) ½½no more than a ¼ kP::9d0½maxdðPðdÞÞ ¼ aþ d0
In Dutch and German, regular negation is used where in English no combines with a
comparative.
(17) Sjeng heeft niet meer dan tien knikkers
S. has not more than ten marbles
gevonden. [Dutch]
found
‘Sjeng found no more than ten marbles.’
(18) Werner hat nicht mehr als zehn Murmeln
W. has not more than ten marbles
gefunden [German]
found
‘Werner found no more than ten marbles.’
One would expect the following semantics for the combination of negation and
comparison:
(19) ½½nicht mehr als a ¼ kP::½maxdðPðdÞÞ > a
Note that ½½no more than a is equivalent to ½½nicht mehr als a and expresses (20):
the set of degree properties whose highest degree is not higher than a.3 In other
words, the semantics of no(t) -er is (20).
(20) kP:maxdðPðdÞÞ  a
The above results in the following semantics for (21).
3 (19) holds only for positive adjectives. For negative antonyms the relations simply switch direction. For
instance:
(i) ½½no fewer than  ¼ P::½maxdðP ðdÞÞ <  ¼ P:maxdðP ðdÞÞ  
Nothing really hinges on the particular implementation, however. One could also adopt an interval based
semantics, where negative antonyms operate on inverted scales. See e.g. Kennedy (2001), Heim (2006).
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(21) Cody found no more than ten marbles.
a. [no more than ten]1 Cody found t1 many marbles
b. maxd(Cody found d-many marbles)  10
c. = the total number of marbles found by Cody  10
As I will now show, this kind of straightforward approach to the semantics of no(t)
-er fails to yield the correct meanings.
3.2 Equality readings
According to the semantics above, no -er constructions express - or -relations.
In reality, however, such constructions behave as if they were comparatives
expressing equality.4 This already becomes clear from such simple examples as
(21). Its preferred interpretation is that Cody found exactly ten marbles. Moreover,
it has an evaluative side-effect of expressing that ten marbles does not count as a lot.
Similarly, (22) says that fifty people showed up and that this can be considered to be
many.
(22) (The organisers expected a small audience. However,) no fewer
than fifty people showed up.
I am not the first person to notice such data.5 Jespersen (1966), for instance, remarks
that ‘‘no less than 30 means exactly 30, implying surprise or wonder at the high
number’’ (p. 83). Elsewhere (Jespersen 1949, entry 16.842 on p. 434), he equates
no more than to as little as and explores the full range of uses of the no more
construction (entries 16.83–16.86). Jespersen notes that there is a difference
between no and not in combinations with comparatives. This contrast, he notes, had
already been observed by Stoffel (1894), who for instance discussed the quote ‘‘The
victorious emperor remained at Rome not more than three months.’’ Stoffel com-
ments on it in the following way: ‘‘This means that he remained three months at
most; if the author had written ‘no more than three months’, this form of expression
would have implied that the author thought this a brief period, and ‘no more than
three months’ would be equivalent to ‘three months only’’’ (Jespersen 1949,
p. 435).
I will ignore the difference between no more and not more for a while and
return to it later. For now, let it be clear that the general observation is that no more
does not express an upper bound, but rather an equality. Similar observations can be
made outside the domain of modified numerals. For instance, the so-called whale
construction (cf. Sawada 2005) uses no more/fewer as an equality.
(23) A whale is no more a fish than a horse.
4 In an earlier version of this article, I used the terminology equative to describe the double-bounded
interpretation of no(t) -er constructions. As rightly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the term
equative is misleading, as equative constructions are usually assumed to express the -relation and not
the ¼-relation (von Stechow 1984). By an equality reading, I mean a reading involving the latter relation.
5 I’m indebted to Doris Penka for pointing out relevant passages in Otto Jespersen’s work.
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What (23) says is that the extent to which a whale is a fish equals the extent to which
a horse is a fish. Similarly, (24) does not say that Holland’s size is at mo`st that of a
very big city, but rather equates it to very-big-city size.
(24) a. Holland is no more than a very big city.
b. Nederland is niet meer dan een zeer grote stad
the Netherlands is not more than a very big city
‘You could compare the Netherlands to a very big city.
The conclusion is that no -er constructions are generally interpreted as equalities.
3.3 Towards an explanation
There is a straightforward way to connect the desired interpretation of (25), in (25a),
to the interpretation (25b) which is derived using the semantics we expect from the
interaction of negation and comparison: (25a) is the exhaustified interpretation of
(25b). The reading in (25b) is asymmetrically entailed by the alternatives in (26).
The reading in (25a) is equivalent to the conjunction of (25b) and the denial of the
alternatives in (26).
(25) No more than thirty people showed up.
a. maxd (d-many people showed up)¼ 30
b. maxd (d-many people showed up) 30
(26) maxd (d-many people showed up) 29
( maxd (d-many people showed up) 28
( maxd (d-many people showed up) 27
( maxd (d-many people showed up) 26
..
.
In other words, the simple non-strict comparison semantics for no more gives rise to
the correct interpretation once we assume that it is exhaustified in a standard way (by
denying stronger alternatives). This is surprising. As explained in Sect. 2, comparative
modified numerals generally lack implicatures. However, the above suggests that this
only holds for strict comparison. The question is, now, why there should be a differ-
ence between strict and non-strict comparison with respect to exhaustification.
Before I turn to that question, I will discuss some more complicated data, con-
cerning scopal interactions, which corroborate the point made so far in this section.
3.4 Scope alternation with modals
The equality readings of negative comparison are strikingly illustrated when we turn
to modal sentences. Consider (27).
(27) Cody’s paper is allowed to have no more than 20 pages.
As I discussed above, comparatives give rise to scope ambiguities when embedded
under a modal operator. Given a non-exhaustive semantics for ‘no -er’, we would
then expect the following two readings for (27).
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(28) a. e[maxd (Cody’s paper has d-many pages) 20pp]
b. maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many pages]) 20pp
One of the possible readings of (27) is (28a). However, it is only available in echoic
uses and needs a distinctive stress pattern. For example, imagine somebody thinking
Cody’s paper is too short, that it should be longer than 20 pages. This can be
contested by saying: You’re wrong, Cody’s paper IS allowed to have no more
than 20 pages.
The reading in (28a) is certainly not the preferred reading for (27). What about
(28b)? This says that papers with 21 or more pages are not acceptable. Notice that it
does not indicate where exactly the page limit is. Specifically, (28b) does not entail
that 20-page papers are allowed. This is a wrong prediction, which can be illustrated
by the contrast in (30).
(29) Cody’s paper is allowed to have no more than 20 pages.
) Cody’s paper is allowed to have 20 pages.
(30) a. Cody’s paper is allowed to be have less than 20 pages. In
fact, the page limit is 15 pages.
b. Cody’s paper is allowed to be have no more than 20 pages.
#In fact, the page limit is 15 pages.
An example like (27) tells the hearer exactly what the upper limit on the number of
pages is. The preferred reading for (27) is (31).
(31) maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many pages]) ¼ 20pp
This is the same observation as I made before: on the basis of the semantics I
proposed for negative comparatives, we expect to find an interpretation involving
non-strict comparison, but in fact a strong equality reading is found.
Similar data exist with universal modals as well. Comparatives embedded under
require yield lower-bounded readings when the maximality operator in the
semantics of -er scopes over the modal. For instance, (32) has a reading which says
that the smallest amount of publications that would still make Cody eligible for
tenure is smaller than four. In other words, there is a number smaller than four such
that Cody needs to publish at least that number of papers. (See Heim 2000 and
Hackl 2000 for details. These examples and the context that helps to trigger the
relevant scope ordering are based on examples in Hackl’s work.)
(32) Cody is not eligible for tenure at MIT. He didn’t publish enough articles.
He can try to get tenure at Acme University, however. There, one is
required to have published fewer than four papers.
The same effect can be observed with no -er comparatives under require, with one
difference. Unlike (32), in (33) the resulting reading specifies an exact lower bound
on how many papers Cody needs to publish. That is, (33) says that this number is
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three. In other words, (33) entails that for tenure at Acme, Cody needs to publish
three articles. Such an entailment is absent in (32).
(33) Cody is not eligible for tenure at MIT. He didn’t publish enough articles.
He can try to get tenure at Acme University, however. There, one is
required to have published no more than three articles in order to get tenure.
Above, I showed that the equality readings can be derived from the readings gen-
erated by the non-strict comparison semantics for no -er by means of exhaustifi-
cation; the same applies to the examples in the current section. For instance, (34a) is
asymmetrically entailed by the alternatives in (34b), and, so, (34c) can be seen as
the exhaustification of (34a).
(34) Cody’s paper is allowed to have no more than 20 pages.
a. maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many-papers]) 20pp.
b. (maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many papers]) 19pp.
(maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many papers]) 18pp.
(maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many papers]) 17pp.
..
.
c. maxd (e[Cody’s paper has d-many papers])¼ 20pp.
Notice that we do not expect an equality reading when the modal takes widest
scope, as in (28a), repeated in (35), since such a reading does not line up on an
entailment scale like the one in (34b).
(35) e[maxd (Cody’s paper has d-many pages) 20pp]
As mentioned above, an analysis of the equality readings that uses exhaustification
is puzzling, for it begs the question why some modified numerals should be subject
to exhaustifications, while others are not. I now turn to this issue.
4 Exhaustification and comparison
What I suggested in the last section is that the equality readings for no -er com-
paratives are the result of a straightforward semantics for negation and comparison,
coupled with exhaustification. In other words, I claim that there is nothing myste-
rious about the semantics of such constructions. The problem is rather how to
account for the possibility of generating implicatures. In order to solve this problem,
I return to the discussion of implicatures for modified numerals that I briefly touched
upon in Sect. 2. As it turns out, one specific proposal for the lack of implicatures for
more than numerals, namely Fox and Hackl (2006), predicts a contrast between
strict and non-strict comparison.
4.1 The universal density of measurements
The original puzzle was why if Cody found more than ten marbles, there is no
implicature denying he found more than eleven. Fox and Hackl (2006) propose a
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radical solution to this puzzle, couched in a principle that states that natural lan-
guage semantics operates with only one kind of scale.
(36) The Universal Density of Measurements (UDM):
Measurement scales that are needed for natural language semantics
are always dense.
(Fox and Hackl 2006, p. 542)
Given the UDM, there is an elegant explanation of why more than ten does not
imply not more than eleven. Say that (37a) has the semantics in (37b).
(37) a. Cody found more than ten marbles.
b. maxd (Cody found d-many marbles) > 10
Given (37b), we are interested in what the stronger alternatives are. Standard
accounts would now say that they are of the form ‘maxd (Cody found d-many
marbles) > n’, with n a natural number exceeding 10. However, given the UDM, we
are forced to consider other stronger alternatives as well. In fact, there now is a
dense (open) scale (10,1) which yields the asymmetrically entailing alternatives.
The implicatures are:
(38) :[maxd (Cody found d-many marbles) > n] with n 2 ð10;1Þ
These implicatures, however, end up contradicting the assertion. Here’s why: (37b)
asserts that there is a d such that Cody found 10 þ d marbles. Whatever d we try,
there will be an implicature denying that Cody found more than 10 þ d=2 marbles.
The implicatures, therefore, will have to be rejected.
A different prediction is made once we turn to non-strict comparison. A meaning
as in (39a) generates the implicatures in (39b).
(39) a. maxd (Cody found d-many marbles)  10
b. :[maxd (Cody found d-many marbles)  n] with n 2 ð10;1Þ
(39a) says that there is a d 2 ½0;1Þ such that Cody found 10 þ d marbles. For
each d > 0, there is an implicature denying that Cody found 10 þ d=2 marbles. No
implicature denies the possibility of Cody finding 10 þ 0 marbles. Consequently, if
we accept the implicatures, we arrive at Cody finding exactly ten marbles. The
UDM predicts, then, that any natural language sentence that expresses (39a) will be
interpreted exhaustively. More generally, the predictions are as follows:
(40) UDM predictions:
* Strict comparison does not yield sensible implicatures
* Non-strict comparison does yield sensible implicatures
These predictions account for the data I discussed in Sect. 3. Any meaning of the
form d  d 0 or d  d 0 will be exhaustified to d ¼ d 0. For instance:
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(41) No more than thirty people showed up.
a. maxd (d-many people showed up) 30
b. implicatures: :[maxd (d-many people showed up) n] with n 2 ½0; 30Þ
c. (a.), (b.) ) maxd (d-many people showed up) = 30
Exactly the same reasoning holds for (42a), when interpreted as (42b).
(42) a. Cody’s paper is allowed to have no more than twenty pages.
b. maxd (e½Cody’s paper has d-many pagesÞ  20pp
The implicatures say that there is no n < 20 such that the upper limit on Cody’s paper
is smaller or equal to n. Taking these implicatures into account, there is only one
possibility left for what the upper limit is: Cody’s paper can’t be longer than 20 pages.
5 More modified numerals
The UDM’s predictions are very sharp and although they suit the data for no more
very well, it needs to be checked whether they do not over-generate exhaustive
readings. Apart from no -er constructions, there are other candidates for the
expression of non-strict comparison. All of these should now yield implicatures.
With respect to (43), however, this seems to be an unwanted prediction.
(43) Cody found at least ten marbles.
is not understood as: Cody found exactly ten marbles
The claim I want to make about such examples is that it is a mistake to think of the
constructions involved as cases of non-strict comparison.
5.1 Superlative modified numerals
Consider the word height.
(44) There is more than one ‘h’ in height.
Someone uttering (44) is speaking the truth, at least as far as English spelling rules
are concerned. Something different happens if we substitute the comparative
modified numeral with what the naive account from Sect. 2 considered its super-
lative equivalent.
(45) There are at least two ‘h’s in height.
From (45) we normally conclude that the speaker does not know how to spell
height. (S/he is, for instance, unsure whether it is ‘height’ or ‘heighth’ – the latter
perhaps in analogy to ‘width’). Similarly:
(46) There are at most two ‘h’s in height.
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Again, (46) is normally said by someone who does not know how to spell. But why
would that be? If (45) and (46) express non-strict comparison, then they should
correspond to (47a) and (47b) respectively. With regard to English spelling rules,
both of these express a truth.
(47) a. the number of ‘h’s in height  2
b. the number of ‘h’s in height  2
Notice that one cannot argue that, although true, (47a) and (47b) are simply too
weak to express how many letters ‘h’ there are in height. For if that reasoning were
to hold, it should also apply to (44), which expresses the true but weak statement
that the number of ‘h’s in height > 1.
So why do the at least/most examples imply the speaker’s ignorance about
English spelling? Geurts and Nouwen (2007) explain this by arguing that the
semantics of superlative modifiers express modal attitudes to alternatives on a scale.
So, rather than to (47) the examples in (45) and (46) correspond to the following.
(48) There are at least two ‘h’s in height.
u½height has two ‘h’s & e½height has more than two ‘h’s
(49) There are at most two ‘h’s in height.
e½height has two ‘h’s & :e½height has more than two ‘h’s
By default, the modality expressed by superlative modifiers is epistemic. Thus, (48)
explicitly states that the speaker considers it possible that the word height has more
than two occurrences of the letter ‘h’. If one knows about the spelling of height, this
would render an utterance of (48) false. Similarly, (49) leaves open the possibility
that height is spelled with just one ‘h’ (like ‘hite’).
There is considerable support for the semantics in (48) and (49). See Geurts and
Nouwen (2007) for detailed theoretical argumentation and Geurts (2007) and Geurts
et al. (2008, unpublished manuscript) for experiments confirming the theory’s
predictions. To mention just one argument for the semantics above, recall from
Sect. 2 that in contrast to comparative numeral modifiers, superlative modifiers do
not trigger an ambiguity when embedded under a modal. So, (50) can only mean
that the upper bound on how many cards one is allowed to pick is 10. It lacks a
weaker reading.
(50) You are allowed to pick at most ten cards.
This is predicted by Geurts and Nouwen since the modal semantics for at most
explicitly denies the possibility of higher alternatives. Moreover, epistemic modality
generally takes widest scope, so scope alternations are not to be expected with
‘allowed’.
The solution to why at least/most do not yield implicatures follows from similar
reasoning. The semantics of superlative modifiers is comparable to that of only or to
the exhaustivity operator. Superlative modifiers use up the alternatives in their
semantics.
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5.2 Other numerals
Superlative numeral modifiers are not the only remaining candidates for the
expression of non-strict comparison. The observation is, however, that the no more/
fewer construction is the only one which results in equality readings.
(51) Cody found at most/least ten marbles.
is not understood as: Cody found exactly ten marbles
(52) Cody found ten or fewer/more marbles.
is not understood as: Cody found exactly ten marbles
(53) Cody found up to ten marbles.
is not understood as: Cody found exactly ten marbles
The explanation of why such constructions lack implicatures is simple, however.
They just do not express (non-strict) comparison: the direct object in (51) is a
superlative construction, the one in (52) is a disjunction, and the one in (53) is a PP.
These come with their own semantics, which might resemble non-strict comparison
in certain ways, yet at the same time (as became clear from the discussion of at
least/most) differ from comparison in subtle but crucial ways.
The case of up to is comparable to that of superlative modifiers. Up to is a
complex directional preposition with an extremely limited distribution.6 In the
domain of numerals, it is similar to at most. For instance, when embedded under a
modal, it resists weak readings.
(54) Cody is allowed to pick up to four cards.
Parallel to the at most data, (54) expresses an upper bound on what Cody is allowed
to pick. It cannot express anything weaker. Like at most, it seems as if up to
consumes alternatives to express an upper bound. This becomes clear from (55),
which (if acceptable) can only be interpreted as the speaker allowing some vari-
ability in the spelling of height. It cannot be interpreted as a simple yet weak truth
spoken by a competent speller.
(55) There are up to two ‘h’s in height
With respect to the observation in (52), a rather different kind of explanation can be
found in Fox (2007). Crucially, however, Fox’s explanation rests on n or more
conforming to the principles that govern the semantics of disjunction. I will not go
into Fox’s reasoning here, but return to it in Sect. 7.
6 Interim conclusion and tying some loose ends
The plot has been as follows. I have shown that no -er comparatives express
equality, and argued that on a straightforward semantics for negation and
6 See Nouwen (2008a) for a detailed account.
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comparison this can be explained if these constructions yield implicatures. Since
strict comparatives are never exhaustified, this begs the question why there should
be such a difference. Fox and Hackl’s principle of the universal density of mea-
surements, however, makes exactly this prediction.
The foregoing contributes to the increasing body of literature that argues for a
more fine-grained view on the varied class of modified numerals that languages like
English have. (See Nouwen (2008b) for a programmatic statement.) What is crucial
for this paper is that there are three kinds of modified numerals:
1. numeral modifiers expressing < or >—these resist exhaustification
example: more than
2. numeral modifiers expressing  or —these yield implicatures
example: no more than
3. other modifiers, which do not straightforwardly express a comparison relation
example: at least
So far, I have presented a compositional semantics of no -er constructions, with
particular attention to how these constructions relate to comparison relations. I have
not, however, explained the full meaning potential of such comparatives. In the
remainder of this section, I will briefly touch upon two loose ends.
6.1 Evaluative readings
The equality reading of no -er constructions comes with an evaluative flavour.
(56) a. no fewer than ten marbles flavour: that’s a lot
b. no more than ten marbles flavour: that’s not a lot
In general, adjectives in a marked form (e.g. the positive forms of negative
adjectives, equatives of negative adjectives) yield evaluative readings (cf. for
instance Bierwisch 1989). If Cody is as tall as Vic, nothing follows about Cody’s
and Vic’s height except that these are the same. However, if Cody is as short as
Vic, it is suggested that Cody and Vic are both short. Whatever the precise
explanation of this phenomenon is, part of it will have to be the fact that the marked
form as short as is expected to yield a marked interpretation. If someone simply
wants to convey that Cody and Vic have the same height, then using an equative
with the positive adjective is the most unmarked way of doing so. Evaluative
readings emerge as a side effect of marked forms.
A similar reason could account for the evaluative flavours of (56). The unmarked
way of referring to a group of 10 marbles is just saying ten marbles. Any more
involved way of reaching the same effect is bound to have an evaluative side effect.
For instance, as many/few as is equally evaluative.7
(57) a. as many as ten marbles flavour: that’s a lot
b. as few as ten marbles flavour: that’s not a lot
7 I am grateful to Irene Heim for bringing this to my attention.
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I will refrain from trying to go into more detail about how evaluative readings are
derived.8 The main point is this: evaluativity is to be expected for no -er con-
structions, given that such constructions would otherwise be rather marked forms
that come with very unmarked interpretations.
6.2 Negation
There is a clear difference between (58a) and (58b):
(58) a. You are allowed to pick no more than ten cards.
b. You are not allowed to pick more than ten cards.
c. :e[maxdð. . .Þ
As observed, the preferred reading of (58a) says that 10 cards is the upper bound on
what one is allowed to pick. In contrast, (58b) says something weaker: picking more
than ten cards is not allowed. In other words, (58b) has the normal non-exhaustified
meaning in (58c).9
The same contrast is found in non-embedded comparatives. In general, no -er has
an equality semantics, whereas not -er has a non-strict comparative one. (As
mentioned above, this contrast was already noticed by Jespersen and Stoffel.)
(59) a. Cody is not more athletic than Vic.
b. Cody is no more athletic than Vic.
Sentence (59b) strongly suggests that neither Cody nor Vic are athletic. In contast,
(59a) simply denies that Cody is more athletic than Vic. That is, (59a) has no
double-bounded meaning, nor does it yield an evaluative flavour.
These data, however, are to a certain extent questionable. I believe both that not -er
can have an (evaluative) equality meaning, and that no -er can have a non-strict com-
parison (upper- or lower-bounded only) meaning. An example of the latter is (60).10
(60) According to EU law, passenger cars are allowed to be 2.50 m wide, but no
wider.
Clearly, no wider has its unstrengthened strict comparison sense here, since a
parallel example with an explicit equative is unacceptable:
(61) #According to EU law, passenger cars are allowed to be 2.50 m wide,
but/and as wide as that.
It seems that the negation involved in no(t) -er constructions can either be simple
(sentential) negation or be interpreted as a denial, where I take denial to involve
widest scope negation. Since exhaustification is only available with non-strict
comparison, we now get the following options for a no(t) -er construction. When
8 See Rett (2007) for a detailed formal approach to evaluativity.
9 Note that (58c) is equivalent to (i), the non-exhausted reading for (58a):
(i) :½maxdðe½. . .Þ > 10
10 Jespersen (1949, entry 16.86, p. 437) hints at a similar example.
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negation is construed with narrow scope, exhaustification can take place since the
negation and the semantics of -er result in non-strict comparison. The result is the
expression of equality. Alternatively, no exhaustification takes place and the result
is simply non-strict comparison. If the negation is taken to be a denial, exhaustif-
ication cannot occur, for it would have to apply to strict comparison. Consequently,
when no(t) -er involves denial, it will have to be interpreted as the denial of strict
comparison. Schematically:
(62) No negation/denial:
[ > ] ¼ regular strict comparison
exh[ > ] ¼ not available
(63) Negation:
[ : > ] ¼ non-strict comparison
exh[ : > ] ¼ equality
(64) Denial:
Denial of [ > ] ¼ non-strict comparison
Denial of exh[ > ] ¼ not available
The data above suggest that the role of denial is preferably played by not, whereas
no is non-widest scope negation in the semantics. In Dutch and German, where the
negated comparison construction is always expressed with regular negation, there is
general ambiguity.
(65) Sjeng heeft niet meer dan tien knikkers gevonden.
S. has not more than ten marbles found
The Dutch example (65) either means that Sjeng found a meager ten marbles, or that
he didn’t find more than 10. The latter reading, however, is only available with
stress on the auxiliary.11
11 An anonymous reviewer wonders why English would allow negative determiners to express the non-
existence of a difference degree, while Dutch and German do not, and observes that English has related
constructions which do not involve cardinality, such as e.g. no longer, which also seem to be lacking in
other languages. The reviewer moreover expresses the worry that such non-cardinality-based construc-
tions do not yield equality readings, given examples like (i) (from Google).
(i) One study concluded that, on average, middle-aged female smokers live no longer than male
smokers.
I share the reviewer’s intuition concerning (i), but do not think this example is representative. As
mentioned above, it should come as no surprise that (evaluative) equality readings are sometimes lacking
from no -er constructions. I believe that, in general, negative comparatives not involving cardinality
behave exactly like those that do. This, in any case, was the intuition already of Stoffel (1894), who
notices the contrast between (iia) and (iib).
(ii) a. He isn’t more to be trusted than you are
b. He is no more to be trusted than you are
Stoffel proposes to paraphrase (iia) as ‘I deny that he is more to be trusted than you are’ (p. 88), and then
states that ‘‘in ‘he is no more to be trusted than you are’, we have the [. . .] negative no prefixed to a
comparative, and here it has the force of changing the sense of more than into that of as little as’’ (ibid).
Upper-bounded no more 287
123
In sum, it is expected that there is some variability in the readings no(t) -er gives
rise to, given the optionality of exhaustivity as well as the option of interpreting the
negation as a form of denial. In Dutch and German this results in a genuine
ambiguity for such constructions. In English, this ambiguity is less clearly present.
I suggested that this may be due to there being two constructions no -er versus
not -er, the latter being more suitable to express denial.
7 Discussion
One might wonder whether it is possible to obtain an account of the no(t) -er data
that is similar to the one above, but does not involve assuming the UDM. In this
final section, I discuss some salient alternatives.
7.1 Dynamic exhaustivity
One option (suggested to me by Robert van Rooij) is to blame the difference in
exhaustification between more than and no more than on the occurrence of
negation in the latter. Before I can investigate this option, I first need to discuss an
alternative explanation of why simple comparative modified numerals do not yield
implicatures.
In van Rooij and Schulz (2006), exhaustification is proposed to be interpretation
in minimal models. Roughly, the proposal is as follows. Exhaustification occurs
with respect to a background question predicate. Such a predicate defines an order
on possible worlds: w is more minimal than w0 with respect to P , or w <P w0, if and
only if the extension of P in w is a proper subset of the extension of P in w0. The
exhaustive interpretation of u w.r.t. P is now the set of worlds in u that are lowest
on the <P -scale. For instance, (66), when interpreted as (66a) against the back-
ground question in (66b), gets the exhaustive interpretation in (66c). The reader may
check that this is the set of worlds in which Cody found exactly three marbles.
(66) Cody found three marbles.
a. n ¼ 9x½marbleðxÞ & foundðc; xÞ & jxj ¼ 3
b. P ¼ kx:marbleðxÞ & foundðc; xÞ
c. exhðn;PÞ ¼ fw 2 n j 8w0 2 n : w 6¼ w0 ! w <P w0g
With a small modification, the minimal models approach to exhaustification can
also account for why a modified numeral like more than three fails to implicate not
more than four. According to van Rooij and Schulz, all one needs to assume is that
(minimal) models do not only involve possible worlds, but moreover involve
assignment functions. In other words, the models taken into account are those of
dynamic, rather than static, semantics. So, say that i is a possibility hw; f i, a possible
world paired with an assignment f , and that likewise i0 ¼ hw0; f 0i. Now, iUP i0 if
and only if f ¼ f 0 and w <P w0.
This changes nothing for (66). In case there are four marbles, m1, m2, m3 and m4,
the possibilities that are left after update with n contain worlds in which Cody found
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three or more marbles, paired with assignment functions that map any trio of found
marbles to x. Say now w0 is a world in which Cody picked all four marbles. There
are four possibilities that contain this world following an update with n, and they
are: hw0; x :¼ m1m2m3i, hw0; x :¼ m1m3m4i, hw0; x :¼ m1m2m4i, and
hw0; x :¼ m2m3m4i. None of these possibilities is minimal with respect to P , for
there will exist a world in which Cody picked exactly three marbles that is paired
with one of the assignment functions w0 is paired with. For instance, if w is a world
in which m1, m2, and m3 were found, then hw; x :¼ m1m2m3iUP hw0; x :¼ m1
m2m3i. The same holds for the other possibilities containing w0: the most
minimal possibilities will only contain worlds like w. Consequently, the exhaustive
interpretation is one where Cody found exactly three marbles.
Things change when we turn to modified numerals.12
(67) Cody found more than two marbles.
a. u ¼ 9x½x ¼ Ry½marbleðyÞ & foundðc; yÞ & jxj > 2
b. P = kx:marbleðxÞ & foundðc; xÞ
c. exh(dynamic)ðu;PÞ w.r.t. context j =
fhw; f i 2 ½uj j 8hw0; f 0i 2 ½uj : ðw 6¼ w0& f ¼ f 0Þ ! w <P w0g
Assume once more that w is a world in which Cody found three marbles and w0 one
in which he found four. In an empty context j:
(68) a. hw; x :¼ m1m2m3i 2 ½uj
b. hw0; x :¼ m1m2m3m4i 2 ½uj
The possibility in (68b) is just as minimal as the one in (68a). This is because iUP i0
only in case i and i0 come with the same assignment function. So even though
w <P w0, the two possibilities in (68) do not stand in the dynamic UP -relation
because their assignment functions differ. The result is that the exhaustive inter-
pretation will contain worlds like w0 where Cody found more than three marbles.
Thus, van Rooij and Schulz are able to account for the puzzle of why more than
two and three differ in exhaustification while at the same time they are equivalent.
The insight is that the equivalence only holds in static logic, but disappears when
dynamics is taken into account.
7.2 Dynamics versus density
Note that van Rooij and Schulz predict no difference between strict and non-strict
comparison. The possibilities left after an update with w in (69) will be exactly the
same as those following u in (67a). That is, u and w are dynamically equivalent.
12 I use R here as the abstraction operator, as in Kamp and Reyle (1993). Ry½u returns the sum of all
individuals y that verify u. The use of abstraction is not essential to van Rooij and Schulz’s dynamic
account of why modified numerals resist exhaustification. The use of abstraction is essential, however,
with downward entailing modified numerals in order to escape the so-called ‘van Benthem trap’ (van
Benthem 1986): non-positive quantifiers containing existential quantification are in danger of having
trivial or overly weak truth conditions.
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(69) w = 9x½x ¼ Ry½marbleðyÞ & foundðc; yÞ & jxj  3
The question is, however, to what extent (69) corresponds to Cody found no fewer
than three marbles. Van Rooij (personal communication) suggests to take the
negation in no -er constructions seriously to yield (70).
(70) w0 ¼ :9x½x ¼ Ry½marbleðyÞ & foundðc; yÞ & jxj < 3
In dynamic semantics, negation is interpreted as a test. In any context, w0 will fail to
change the value for x. Consequently, there is no role for the variable assignments in
dynamic exhaustification. The result is that the exhaustive interpretation of w0 is
fully determined by selecting the most P -minimal worlds in which Cody did not find
fewer than three marbles. These are the worlds in which Cody found exactly three
marbles.
Actually, things are a little bit more complex than this. Note that it would be
wrong to predict now that the same reasoning applies to no more than, for the most
minimal worlds in which Cody did not find more than three marbles are the worlds
in which he didn’t find any. One needs to assume that negation flips the scale and
that, suddenly, we are interested in the most maximal worlds. This is needed any-
way to prevent Cody didn’t find all marbles from being interpreted as Cody not
finding any marbles. For w0 in (70), one needs to assume then that there is a double
flipping, one by the negation, one by the <. Consequently, for (70), it is minimal
worlds that count once again.
If van Rooij’s suggestion is on the right track, then there is no longer any reason to
believe in a difference between the implicatures of strict and those of non-strict com-
parison. The only reason we observe a difference is that non-strict comparison is
expressed using negation, whereas strict comparison is expressed by a lexical primitive.
But how do we choose between w and w0? In static logic the two are equivalent.
The only difference is their dynamics. How do we choose which is the best dynamic
profile? Normally, we would look at anaphora. As far as no more/fewer than is
concerned, however, a representation as w seems preferable over w0, for such
modified numerals do not seem to block pronominal reference in discourse. An
analysis as in (71b) would therefore be problematic: the last occurrence of x is
dynamically bound in (71a), but not in (71b).
(71) Cody found no fewer than three marbles. He keeps them in a little box.
a. 9x½x ¼ Ry½marbleðyÞ & foundðc; yÞ & jxj  3 & keeps in boxðc; xÞ
b. :9x½x ¼ Ry½marbleðyÞ & foundðc; yÞ & jxj < 3 & keeps in boxðc; xÞ
The reality is that we found two sentences which are truth-conditionally equiva-
lent, have the same potential for subsequent pronominal anaphora, yet differ in
their exhaustive interpretation. That is, the motivation for choosing the static
representation w0 over the dynamic w would be motivated by exhaustivity only.13
13 Note, however, that one could argue that tests like (71) are not suitable to determine the dynamics of
the underlying semantic representation, given the existence of techniques in dynamic semantics to
account for anaphora that involve essentially static interpretations. See, for instance, the treatment of
generalised quantifiers in Kamp and Reyle (1993). See Nouwen (2007) for discussion.
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In other words, one would have to disconnect anaphora and dynamics for this to
work.
There is another way in which van Rooij and Schulz’s dynamic account is
separated from a theory of discourse. In some specific contexts, dynamic exhaus-
tivity will give the wrong result if the context’s actual information state, inclusive its
assignment to variables, is taken into account. Take the following example. Say we
are talking about four friends of ours: Ann, Bob, Carl, and Dirk. All four of them
have taken an exam last week. You know that Ann, Bob, and Carl passed, but you
have had no information as yet about Dirk. Then you hear the following:
(72) Three of your friends passed the exam.
According to the interpretation 9x½friendðxÞ & passðxÞ & jxj ¼ 3, there are now
two possibilities left. Either the actual world is such that exactly three of your
friends passed, call this world w, or the world is such that all four of your friends
passed, call this world w0.14 In the context described above, there is only one
possible assignment function that can be paired with a world, like w, in which
exactly three friends passed. That is, if exactly three friends pass, then we are in w
and x must be assigned the group made of Ann, Bob, and Carl. There will be no
possibility that pairs a world other than w0 with a function assigning Dirk as part of
the value for x. To be precise, the possibilities after updating with (72) are:
(73) i1 ¼ hw; x :¼ abci
i2 ¼ hw0; x :¼ abci
i3 ¼ hw0; x :¼ abdi
i4 ¼ hw0; x :¼ acdi
i5 ¼ hw0; x :¼ bcdi
Dynamic exhaustification will exclude i2 (since i1 is more minimal), but no other
possibility (since the assignments differ). In other words, in this particular context
one would expect that exhaustification does not deliver an exactly reading for the
bare numeral. Such context dependence of implicatures is not observed, however.
Van Rooij and Schulz can escape these predictions by assuming that, as far as
exhaustification is concerned, all possibilities should always be taken into account.
That is, the process of deriving an exhaustive interpretation operates on the full
update potential of expressions, not on their effect in the actual context. In this
respect there is a striking similarity between Fox and Hackl’s density thesis and van
Rooij and Schulz’s dynamic semantic proposal. Both accounts rely on the
assumption that exhaustive interpretation takes place on a level that is independent
from contextual interpretation. Just like the UDM claims that possibilities we would
never consider (as, for instance, Cody having three and a half children) have a
pragmatic effect, van Rooij and Schulz have to assume that the knowledge we have
gained about the discourse is ignored as far as exhaustification is concerned.
14 I’m simplifying here. There would be many more worlds, but for the purpose of these examples they
would be exactly like w or w0 with respect to the relevant properties.
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Although this observation might be somewhat surprising, I can see no theoretical
objections against either van Rooij and Schulz’s or Fox and Hackl’s assumption.
There is, however, another complication with van Rooij’s suggestion that the
negation in no -er constructions rather than density is to blame for the observed
implicatures. Note that the predicate logical forms above are rather classic repre-
sentations of a sentence containing a modified numeral. Such representations are
unsuitable for capturing the observation of Hackl (2000) that comparatively mod-
ified numerals display the same ambiguities as ordinary comparatives when
embedded under an intensional/modal operator (see Sect. 2.2). For instance, (74a)
has a reading in which six is the upper bound on how many cards Cody is allowed to
pick. But if we assume that its interpretation should be based on (74b) then there is a
problem. There is no position in (74b) where inserting a weak modal operator would
yield the intended meaning of (74a).
(74) a. Cody is allowed to pick fewer than six cards.
b. 9x½x ¼ Ry½cardðyÞ & pickðc; yÞ & jxj < 6
In order to get the observed reading involving an upper bound on the number of
cards Cody is allowed to pick, it is customary to assume that the semantics of -er
contains a maximality operator over degrees or cardinalities (and so, crucially, not a
maximality operator over groups, like R).15 So, rather than on (74b), the semantics
of (74a) should be based on (75). The two readings for (74a) correspond to either
having the modal within or outside the scope of the maximality operator, as in (76a)
and (76b). (See Hackl 2000 for detailed discussion.)
(75) maxd½9x½cardðxÞ & pickðc; xÞ & jxj ¼ d < 6
(76) a. emaxd½9x½cardðxÞ & pickðc; xÞ & jxj ¼ d < 6
b. maxd½e9x½cardðxÞ & pickðc; xÞ & jxj ¼ d < 6
The problem is, now, that on this analysis any comparatively modified numeral is
interpreted statically, given the wide scope of the modal and the maximality
operator. Consequently, on the dynamic exhaustivity account fewer/more than
three will wrongly be predicted to give rise to the same implicatures as no more/
fewer than four. This means that so far we are unable to have both dynamic
exhaustification and an account of the comparative nature of comparatively modi-
fied numerals. In contrast, as I explained in previous sections, the UDM and the
comparative semantics for modified numerals need no further reconciliation.
15 One might think the same effect can be derived by assuming a semantics as in (74b) without a form of
maximality, but with the possibility of (minimal model style) exhaustive interpretation. Giving the modal
wide scope over (74b) results in the weak reading that has been observed for (74a). Exhaustifying that
reading does not yield the preferred interpretation, however. The reason is that (74b) with wide scope ‘e’
is very weak: it does not pose any bound on how many card Cody is allowed to pick. Consequently, if we
take the background question predicate to be the set of groups of cards Cody is allowed to pick, then the
minimal worlds that verify (74b) will be worlds in which Cody isn’t allowed to pick any card. If, rather
than minimality, maximality is at stake, the worlds in which Cody is allowed to pick any number of cards
will be selected, since these too are compatible with (74b).
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Somewhat related to this is the fact that the UDM can explain why implicatures
suddenly do arise with more than numerals once they are embedded under strong
modals. (This is one of the major points of Fox and Hackl 2006.) The example in
(77) implicates that Cody is not required to pick more than five cards.
(77) Cody is required to pick more than four cards.
The implicature for (77) falls out of the UDM, since strong modals have the
property of turning open scalar properties into closed ones (see Fox and Hackl 2006
for details). Crucially, weak modals lack this feature, which explains why (78) does
not yield an implicature.
(78) Cody is allowed to pick more than four cards.
If the contrast between weak and strong modals were to be explained in terms of
dynamic exhaustivity, one would have to assume a dynamic profile for strong
modals and a static one for weak modals. I can see no independent motivation for
this.
7.3 Alternatives
Fox (2007) discusses an alternative to the Universal Density of Measurement
assumption based on the observation that modified numerals like four or more do
not yield implicatures. Fox links such cases to the simple disjunctions discussed by
Sauerland (2004). A sentence like John talked to Mary or Sue is asymmetrically
entailed both by John talked to Mary and by John talked to Sue, and so we might
think that there are at least the implicatures that John did not talk to Mary and that
John did not talk to Sue. However, such implicatures in tandem deny the assertion
that was made. This, according to Sauerland, is why such implicatures do not arise.
Fox argues that a similar effect explains why four or more does not end up
meaning exactly four. He notices first of all that such disjunctive modified numerals
are in danger of violating a general constraint on disjunction known as Hurford’s
Generalisation (Hurford 1974):
(79) Hurford’s Generalisation:
#[A or B] whenever B entail A
Standard illustrations of this generalisation are examples like #John lives in France
or in Paris. If (79) is to apply to all disjunctions, then one might wonder why four
or more marbles is felicitous, since the lower bound reading of the numeral is
entailed by the second disjunct. Fox concludes that such modified numerals should
therefore be seen as already partly locally exhaustified. So four or more corre-
sponds to exh[four] or more. Exhaustification here will be similar to the cases
discussed by Sauerland: (80a) yields two implicatures, (80b) and (80c), which taken
together with (80a) form a contradiction, and this, Fox argues, is why no implicature
arises.
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(80) a. Cody found four or more marbles.
b. It is not the case that Cody found exactly four marbles.
c. It is not the case that Cody found more than four marbles.
Such an explanation, Fox notes, at the same time paves the way for an alternative to
the universal density approach, for, as suggested in Spector (2005), one could take
more than three to have the same alternatives as four or more. So, Cody found
more than three marbles has the implicatures in (80b) and (80c). Although the
particular set of alternatives used for such an explanation has to be stipulated and is
rather unintuitive, it would give all the right results with respect to exhaustification.
(See Fox 2007 for detailed discussion. See also Russell 2006.)
Note, however, that such an alternative explanation becomes doubtful in the light
of the observations I have presented in the previous sections, for it necessitates a
further stipulation that no fewer than four differs from four or more and more
than three with respect to its alternatives. To me, this seems to be one stipulation
too many. In any case, I am extremely sceptical that we will find a reason (inde-
pendent of the very observations made here) for both why the latter two share their
alternatives and why the former’s set of alternatives differs from these. This paper
demonstrates the need to distinguish two classes of modified numerals, but I see no
way of making it convincing that what sets these two classes apart is the set of
alternatives the expressions in question give rise to.
7.4 Conclusion
The main point of the paper is a rather simple one: some modified numerals give
rise to (scalar) implicatures. I have argued that one explanation for this is that such
implicatures are the result of exhaustification of non-strict comparatives with
respect to a dense scale. An approach involving dense scales has important
advantages over alternative theories, since it predicts such a division, without fur-
ther assumptions. One alternative to the use of the density assumption, however, is
to counter my claim that the two classes correspond to the strict/non-strict
comparison distinction and to assume that it is instead the negation in no -er
constructions that is responsible for the implicatures. In that case, a theory of
dynamic exhaustivity as in van Rooij and Schulz (2006) might be able to cover the
data. Unfortunately, it is so far not clear how to extend such a theory so that it
accounts for the range of data involving comparatives discussed in Fox and Hackl
(2006) and Hackl (2000). Although the above is not an unequivocal demonstration
of the role of density in the process of exhaustification, it shows that density covers
the full set of data involving modified numerals with only minimal and indepen-
dently developed means.
The data discussed in this paper sharpen the desiderata for theories of exhaus-
tification. In this regard, the analysis illustrates the merits of conducting a detailed
inquiry into the distinguishing features of various kinds of particular quantifiers,
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